Machinbird,
"A big clue that they were experiencing fear related stress is that they were not hearing the stall warning alarm while it was sounding (other than right at the beginning when it chirped at them a couple of times). The ears are one of the first things to shut down under stress."
You say that, but how do you know this? How is it you "know" they heard the Stall Warn the first time, at AP quit? How do we "know" they either "did not perceive" the following alarms, but instead were only "ignoring" them, perhaps having rejected the warnings as spurious?
This is the problem with "knowledge". Sometimes (often?) it is equated with facts....what we know is based on input....
We do "know" for instance, that the CVR data is not complete. I "know" this because the investigative agency has said so.
So you might respond, "if the crew were discussing recovery and mentioned a "Stall", that would of course be reported...."
You may assume the crew was cognizant of degrade to Alternate Law immediately? In point of fact, the degrade to AL was not memorialized until eleven seconds AFTER loss of AP and speeds.
"We've lost the speeds, Alternate Law......." (02:10:21)......
Do you recall the reported status of cockpit data? "Nothing was recorded from the Right Side of the Cockpit"?
To my knowledge, there is but one accident involving Airbus equipment where the pilots are suggested to be completely at fault.....(447)
There is on record an accident where flight data recorders were switched, the replacement recorder had falsified data.
The official record of 447 can be reasonably defended. But this reasonable defense is dependent on data that is ostensibly unavailable?