Doesn't the last page just show how mixed up this is? People want to exchange a view but the nub of that gets washed away in a bunch of qualification and caveat - it's utter nonsense.
Currency / recency - what is going to be interesting is how any intelligence is given to the thinking behind any new regime which wasn't apparent before. Then the how and why that might have prevented this accident... Then square that with why that regime wasn't in place before or when risks suddenly became apparent. Then why that conversation needs 18 months to figure/communicate.
Just this once seems to have called it:-
I have wondered the same. The CAA had set incredibly low standards that were way below comparable military requirements and yet appear to have no demonstrable audit chain to underpin such low recency/currency requirements for high-performance swept-wing jets. This would struggle to meet the Clapham Omnibus test, let alone a reasoned expert witness.
That they allowed someone to achieve a display qualification on a straight-wing basic trainer such as the JP as a means to display a Hunter is professional madness - yet this is what the CAA did, whilst billing people for the privilege.
There has been a lot of focus on Mr Hill and the company (rightly so of course) but it does not take long to tug on the threads of this incident to find a supine, target-driven and business-focused CAA at the other end. Somehow the CAA has lost 'aviation' as one of its core competencies.