Quote from WingNut60:
"Somehow I just can not reconcile the paradoxical logic (presumably based on in-depth risk analysis) that says it is safe to operate a twin engine aircraft for up to 3 hours on one engine (ETOPS 180) but then says, in the case of an engine failure you had better land at the first suitable airport, at peril of losing your profession, if you elect to fly a little further to a "more suitable" location ..... ie support services, etc.
The inference, for me, is that the argument for ETOPS is not really as well founded as it should be."
Fair discussion point. Many of us were sceptical during the evolution of ETOPS provisions in the 1980s and '90s. I guess we've been waiting for something like a diversion to Nassarsuak** in marginal conditions, and keeping our fingers crossed.
Maybe the difference between the situations before and after the engine failure is that, without permitting flight up to (say) 3 hours at single-engine speed from the nearest suitable aerodrome, the flight would have to be cancelled, re-routed, or operated with more than two engines.
On any given flight with these turbofans the first engine failure has proved to be, as argued then, an extremely low probability. Once it has taken place, the probability of a second failure is comparable: i.e., extremely low, in the 3 hours allowed. But it would almost certainly be catastrophic. Therefore, anything that can be done to mitigate that risk should be done.
The choice of aerodrome, if there is choice, may involve judgment. But the criterion of maximising the safety and welfare of the passengers and crew must take priority over any others, including operational considerations and aircraft recovery. None of that overrides the commander’s discretion, of course.
As they say: just my tuppence' worth.
** (Although I'm not sure Nassarsuak is necessary in the ETOPS 180 case.)