mach2number
The problem not so many years ago was that we were taught procedural safety as a foil to absolute physical safety (which is unachievable). I doubt anyone knew what a F765X was and would probably not have been encouraged to submit one.
The use of MF765 (Unsatisfactory Feature Report) is laid down a number of documents, the primary one being the mandated procedural Defence Standard that controls maintenance of the build standard (now cancelled without replacement) – without which the safety case cannot be validated and no Release to Service can be issued. There, gliders in a nutshell.
In the early 1990s, funding to do this was cut by 28% per year, for over 3 years. Direct orders were issued not to use the MF765 (or MF760 fault reporting) systems – part of the “savings at the expense of safety” confirmed by Mr Haddon-Cave; although he dated them to 1998, not 1987, despite the actual documents and directives being submitted to him. There, systemic airworthiness failings in a nutshell.
While some of this work has been resurrected, by no means all – evidenced by the much abbreviated definition of it in the MAA documentation. Plainly, no-one in the MAA has ever managed such work before. There, current problems in a nutshell.
Sorry, to seem a little pedantic, but you mean functional safety, not physical. But you are right – very few are taught how to achieve either. And anyone who doesn’t know what a MF765 is, shouldn’t really be allowed near an aircraft unaccompanied. And anyone who encourages staff not to raise them shouldn’t be in employment. There, MoD’s personnel problems in a nutshell!