Inadequate Training Key To Garuda Indonesia Excursions
WASHINGTON—Final reports by Indonesia’s National Transportation Safety Committee (NTSC) on two 2015 Garuda Indonesia Airlines runway excursions point to inadequate training for pilots and, in one case, for air traffic controllers.
The first serious incident, in February 2015, involved an ATR72-600 landing at the Lombok Praya International Airport on the island of Lombok, Indonesia,after a short flight from Bali.
According to the final report, the pilot-in-command (PIC) most likely used improper flight control inputs to counter a crosswind after the aircraft bounced three times upon landing, causing the twin turboprop to exit the right side of the runway.
While no passengers or crew members were injured, damage to the aircraft included a collapsed nose gear and damage to the right propeller.
The aircraft had experienced a tailwind and crosswind from the right side during landing, which would normally require left rudder and right aileron input to maintain directional control. However during the bounces, the PIC applied right rudder and left aileron input, causing the aircraft’s nose to turn right about 15 deg.
Contributing to the incident was the PIC taking control from the second-in-command—a first officer in training who was on the controls initially—during the final stages of the landing without making “clear statements” on who was in control.
NTSC recommendations included two for Garuda, calling on the airline to emphasize crosswind handling in its training and to review its policy for transfer of control. After the incident, the airline independently issued an instruction to its pilots to “strictly follow” stabilized approach criteria, procedures that typically call for a go-around after a botched landing.
The second runway excursion involved a Garuda Boeing 737-800 landing at the Sultan Hasanuddin International Airport in Makassar, Indonesia, during a thunderstorm in June 2015.
The crew had prepared for a landing on Runway 3 at the airport, calculating a landing distance of 6,890 ft., which would use 84% of the 8,200-ft. runway. Controllers later routed the aircraft to Runway 13 due to a thunderstorm in the approach path to Runway 3.
On its final approach to Runway 13 the aircraft was in a stable condition with a 10-kt. tailwind and 10-kt. crosswind. However, an unanticipated wind change to a headwind—created by the mature thunderstorm ahead—resulted in the aircraft floating for 13 sec. before touching down 4,700 ft. down the runway. Upon landing, the aircraft entered a heavy downpour from the thunderstorm.
As the end of the runway appeared, the captain turned slightly left, which resulted in the nose gear and the left main landing gear becoming stuck in mud off the end of the pavement.
The pilots told investigators that they did not consider a go-around “as they were aware that the takeoff area of the Runway 13 was a mountainous area and might jeopardize the flight.”
Safety recommendations for Garuda include reviewing its pilot training with respect to cumulonimbus development stages and emphasizing go-arounds when a safe landing cannot be made.
For AirNav Indonesia, the air navigation service provider that staffs the tower, the NTSC called for providing all controllers with meteorology training that includes understanding of cumulonimbus clouds and wind shear, training which controllers had not previously received. “The controllers assumed that the cloud formations were cumulonimbus, however they did not understand what stage of the cumulonimbus,” the NTSC said in the final report. “The controllers also did not recognize any visual sign of wind shear as they had never been trained for wind shear.”
Immediately after the incident, Garuda independently revised its ground and simulator recurrent training for the 737 to include wind shear avoidance and recovery.
Inadequate Training Key To Garuda Indonesia Excursions | Commercial Aviation content from Aviation Week