KayPam, if the altitude (ADC) is referenced to the 'standard pressure setting, then the display is 'Flight Level' irrespective of the numerical value.
Re inhibition of AoA; refer to regulations on preventing the display of 'hazardously misleading information'; in every operating situation.
Re seeing values, feeling acceleration "...the crew should have realized that."
This might be a reasonable assumption without the effect of startle, but where sensory awareness is disrupted and automatic responses triggered due to surprise, then inability to realise is to be expected.
Similarly the reasonable advice 'sit on your hands, do nothing' may not be recalled from memory because of the overriding subconscious startle response.
Thereafter, as cognitive capacity is restored, the do nothing advice may not apply in the changed situation.
The brain could be behind the drag curve for some time, particularly for conflicting demands to 'assess the situation' and 'do nothing' advice; a clash of objectives (
cognitive dissonance). Resolving these problem requires great mental effort - forget 'this', do 'that', pilots have to be adaptable .
One training task is to embed knowledge such as the maximum rate of change of altitude to be expected - even in upsets, and without associated accelerations or other instrument indications (VS). Also the need to view the wider picture, multiple instrument scan, integrate body senses, and compare this with previous experiences.
Training has a great responsibility in this area, the choice of sudden situations (rarely instantaneous or extreme), knowledge of aircraft systems, accuracy of simulator / CBT situations, knowledge of the atmosphere, of human behaviour.
The purpose of training is to embed specific knowledge in memory so that it can be accessed by the fast 'system1' thinking which takes over during startle.
A vital aspect would be to teach 'know-how' opposed to know-what. This is the training debate about knowledge recall - checking vs education - how to learn and gain meaningful experience.
This is an area which Airbus has considered and may have embodied into their training.
And as for all the other 'monkey knowledge', it may be irrelevant if the industry addresses the initiating contributing factor ('root cause') instead of outcome symptoms. Fix the pitot problem before you try to fix the crew, and even then consider the crew as a resource not a threat.
The regulator has significant responsibility in is area, but may be hampered by their own safety system: - retrospective hazard identification and dependency on regulation to control; a lengthy bureaucratic process.