Surprise represents the difference between expectations and reality.
Fear is a natural response to perceived danger, which usually depends on prior knowledge.
'Startle response' is an unconscious reaction to a sudden or threatening situation (fight or flight). Startle involves automatic (subconscious) reaction and reduced cognitive ability; the focus of attention is towards the perceived threat leading to tunnel vision and the need to act. The startle response could continue if the actions do not effect a recovery, deepening the startle and reinforcing the chosen action, even if, in hindsight, this is wrong.
Startle could be reduced by avoiding surprising situations, by understanding and enhancing the recognition of startle, and being prepared (experienced) to manage an undesired state. Like error, startle cannot be irradiated, thus avoidance, detection, recovery and mitigation aspects apply.
Self-confidence and experience are important defences, particularly those which improve the perception of surprising situations and time available for actions.
Self-confidence could be improved with exposure to surprising' situations, but this may require 'real surprise'. Are simulators (instructors) able to generate sufficient realism to induce startle or fear.
Avoidance would involve improving system reliability - avoid grandfather rights, and reconsider the assumptions in certification. System failures are a probability; we tend forget that extremely improbably events can and do occur, and we often assume too much about pilot capability in extreme situations.
With increasing levels of safety the industry needs to adjust its view. Instead of attempting to identify all threats and regulate people, accept that in rare circumstances the outcomes are only a probability. Pilots should be encouraged to be adaptable, helped to judge situations and be allowed to deviate from the norm, and even encouraged to make (small, inconsequential) errors. Training has to enable pilots to manage the uncertainties in flying, not just the few 'certainties' in procedures.
Greater depth of basic knowledge could help pilots form a more accurate perception of startling events to help reduce the effect, the magnitude and/or duration..
Experience as in 'know-how' could be improved by re considering basic procedures:
e.g. operators claim to have good CRM practices by involving crew in decisions. However, which view offers greater learning:
Capt - "re weather ahead, we should deviate left 15 deg?" ( a tick in the CRM box) or
Capt - "re weather ahead, what would you suggest we do?". The latter exercises the crews' mind and decision process; it adds experience of actually doing something in a real situation.
Perhaps this aspect in some small way applied to the AF447 accident; I recall a telling graphic of the track deviation of other aircraft at the time, compared with the smaller deviation of AF447.
Instead of active recovery training, the focus should be more on awareness and the need to change the course of action. e.g. disciplined behaviour to use what little cognitive resource remains to reconsider why the situation may not be improving:- "am I using the correct action", or "do I really understand the situation".
Stop, rethink, break tunnel vision; but that may require realistic startling events.
Think slow, but faster.
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