'pulse1' said:
"Having lost 6 close friends out of total of 22 during his first carrier tour, my old friend said that he would buy himself out if he had to do another. He did do a second tour and they lost no-one so something must have improved."
I can only guess that from research about 'how others deck landed' that the re-introduction of LSOs to help ameliorate the loss of Sea Vixens and crews perhaps was a factor. Of course there are many other factors as outlined/hinted at in this thread.
“...This large aircraft [Sea Vixen] was operated from small aircraft carriers by day and night. It was difficult to deck land because being an aerodynamically clean aircraft it had low profile drag. The consequence of this was that the throttles were retarded to about one third of their travel in order to command the low thrust required for a constant speed approach critical for deck landing. The engines were therefore operating in the lower rpm response time margins when fully configured on approach to land. Speed control was difficult and speed accuracy was essential to the safe conduct of a deck landing....”
http://www.seavixen.org/sea-vixen-accidents-public-page
FLY NAVY - The view from the cockpit 1945-2000 - Lieutenant Commander Bob McQueen, Commanding Officer, 899 Squadron, Sea Vixens, HMS Eagle, 1966. RNAS Yeovilton, 1968
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“In the course of my 700-odd fixed-wing carrier landings in the comparatively safe environment of the angled deck, several refinements were introduced to improve the art of deck-landing and make it safer.
One was the 'Donkey's Tail', a vertical string of lights dropped down over the ship's stern to extend the very short line of lights indicating the deck centreline. For the pilot on approach at night its effect was magical, for the slightest deviation from the true centreline immediately showed up as a kink in the donkey's tail, allowing much more precise line-up control than before; and as a Sea Vixen landing at 130 knots on one of the smaller carriers like Centaur or Hermes could not be more than two feet off-centre without the risk of hitting something, this was important.
Even more momentous was the introduction of the LSO or Landing Safety Officer, previously the 'batsman', who had been pronounced redundant with the introduction of the mirror landing sight. Initial problems with the big fast jets forced a re-think on this and the LSO reappeared in the form of a senior pilot, of such experience that even I as a Squadron C.O. could not question his judgement, monitoring all landings from the deck-edge with the power to 'wave off' any dubious approaches. And because his assessment of each landing was posted up in stark colour on a board in that most public of places, the Squadron briefing-room - red for dangerous; yellow, passable; green, good; and green star, teacher's pet - deck-landing became competitive. The LSO, stalking the crewrooms with his clipboard preaching the one true faith, standardization, was at first resented by some of us more senior and experienced pilots, but there was no escaping the very public verdict of 'The Board', or the fact that deck-landing safety improved tremendously, to the extent that most pilots including myself were soon catching the target No.3 wire on the centreline every time. Dare one say - a little tame?
However, other things could happen to spoil a pretty row of 'greens'. [OK landings as shown on a 'greenie board']”
[SEA VIXEN] Lt. Cdr. (P) John E. Kelly. RN.“...6/1/1961 he witnessed Accident ID 4. From his Interview:
http://www.seavixen.org/aircrew-test...ies-john-kelly
"The C.O. Dave Stanley and myself as No2, followed by a second pair Lt. Cdr. Jeff Varley and Lt Dudgeon set off for night touch and go DLP. On completion of my 4 night DLP's and Hook On, I went to Flyco to witness the second pair. On the final (4th) night approach Lt Dudgeon was authorised for "Hook Down".
There was no LSO in those days. The approached seemed a little unsettled and Lt Dudgeon self waved off. His port wing tip struck an engine box parked in Fly 4. A six foot section of his port wing separated and the aircraft continued inverted down the flight deck and crashed into the sea. His previous approaches had been perfect. Lt Dugeon was a highly skilled and experienced night deck lander from the Sea Venom days. Jeff Varley who had just landed on and was walking back to the Island also witnessed this sad occassion....”
Personal Testimony of Sea Vixen Operations by: Lt. (P) Jonathon Whaley. RN. 1965/1973
http://www.seavixen.org/aircrew-test...onathan-whaley
“Am I qualified to write a "Pilots Perspective" on the Sea Vixen? Well as probably the only pilot left that still flies a jet fighter
www.heritageaviation.com and who flew Sea Vixens operationally for two tours, one as Air Warfare Instructor (AWI), I stake my claim.
I'm allowing myself (or I hope the Ed. will) a paragraph of "Soap Box" One of the primary requirements for acceptance in to the Royal Navy and in particular as Naval Aircrew, is to have a sense of humour. The source of "If you can't take a joke, you shouldn't have joined" the Senior Service. If your sense of humour was slightly warped, then a) you were a survivor by nature and b) destined for great things.
The Fleet Air Arm, at the time I joined in 1965, were losing about 1½ aircrew a year per squadron. That's three killed out of 28 Pilots and Observers. You gotta have a sense of humour just to want to join! Circa 1971 "SOPs" were tightened up and "job's worth" criteria added to restrict the antics of aircrew such that losses were dramatically reduced. In 1969 when we lost a couple of Vixens flying in to the sea at night, the papers never mentioned it. To day, such rare accidents are front page news. I'm not saying today's restrictions in flight ops are wrong in any way, just that I was lucky enough to fly (and survive) in the last few years....”