Assuming that the FDR stopped recording with the loss of essential electrical power, an indication that all engines had failed, then the previous selection of wheels and flap down could indicate some aspects of standard operation. The crew appeared to have set up for a 'normal' approach, perhaps also indicating a weak understanding of the fuel state.
(I hope that someone will be able correlate the loss of FDR with the ATC timelines and crew communication).
Lack of fuel awareness might be interpreted by the 'bad apple' theory of human performance (illogical, irrational thought / rouge behaviour), but a more tempered view of the crew's lack of concern probably represents their joint view of the situation at that time - normal behaviour (rational thought.)
Alternatively this could suggest that the crew did not look, appreciate, or have accurate indications of fuel quantity, or even any indication at all (MEL?); we don't know.
And of course there are many options between these views, again we don't, and may never know.
Faced with a total loss of power, the very surprising realisation that fuel had run out, and the inability to retract flaps and gear, then there would be very few options. If the crew knew where the airfield was (not indicated by ATC comms) then the next judgement would be if the aircraft was capable of reaching it, probably not.
The alternative, and extremely fraught and surprising reality required an off airport landing, which demands significant rethinking of normal flight operations in severely stressful circumstances.
Without knowing position relative to the airfield, and thus terrain, then there would be little choice of landing site; + night time.
Thus if there were a logical decision (under stress), the choice of a slow speed and lowest rate of descent flight appears to the best, if only option.