The discussion starts t head in the inevitable Pprune direction...
I am self loading freight in these machines and so have some interest in them holding together.
Normally it would be considered very surprising for a manufacturer to state that their product was perfectly safe to fly - before the latest investigation report is delivered.
For a certification agency to support those statements and strongly suggest the aircraft is safe without modification or the report published is again very unusual - until you realise the national and commercial aspects of this case.
The vulnerability of the main shaft to failure started the concerns. Whilst virtually all the attention was there, the planet gears were apparently spalling and AH's understanding of the gearbox behaviour considerably lagged operational experience.
As to the comment that the replacement could or would be worst? Pretty unlikely you would have to step back to 1960s designs to see this level of componentry failure - which is not impossible but would mean any manufacturer would be toast - which may be where AH ends up.
The real disappointment is the certification system. Both the 225 and 92 have a significant level of 'grandfathering' in their approvals - with more of that happening in the 225's case. It has significantly undermined confidence in the certification process - the first 92 failures occurred at shockingly low fleet hours. Whilst the filter issues are now supposedly sorted I've not heard a fix to the gearbox foot cracking - is it all resolved now?
Pushing up power and weight and making incremental changes to compensate is the classic method to create engineering failures. The best example probably being bridges - where every concept has be enlarged and enlarged until the point at which it failed.
But back to the plot, I wish the best of luck to any management team trying to persuade their offshore teams that rotors flying off the machine is sorted - without a shiny new and much better gearbox.