archae86:
I'm not a pilot, but spent years in responsible positions in very high-value, high-technology factories. A lesson there is that maintenance of even the most critically important equipment was less likely to be successful for aspects of operation not having any impact in normal circumstances.
Obviously normal fleet operation does not involve frequent exploration of the zero-fuel end of fuel-state operations. I wonder whether there are plausible failure modes which might have introduced a modest zero-offset in the fuel readout of this aircraft, and whether (possibly slopply) maintenance and normal operational experience might have left that error in place for weeks.
If such an error was already in place on previous excessive range flights, all concerned might not have detected just how close those flights came to exhaustion. If the error was in place on this flight, alerts and indications may have come later than people posting on this thread are assuming.
Since normal operations seem unlikely to verify the zero-fuel readout point directly, what special procedure or maintenance is done which would catch such an error? How frequently?
I think i understand you, as electronic engineer and now an airline pilot, having flown both small props, turboprops, medium jets and now heavy jets.
Problem is (and always will be) the human being.
There are numerous procedures in place to operate/maintain and dispatch a(ny) commercial airplane.
(just try to imagine how can boeing/airbus/embraer/bombardier/fokker/atr etc etc sell aircraft all over the world)
All those manufacturers need to sell airplanes and make sure, south-americans, african, asian, european even american companies and pilots know how to operate those airplanes.
So, to prevent major court cases and lawyers at work, 99,9% is all written down.
Problem is how any company and/or pilot or crew is implementing it all.
Family-life, finances, kids, company-future, fatigue, rank, knowledge, pressure (or delays), etc etc
Inop fuel-gauges, instruments, sensors etc etc may be in the MEL.
(manufacturers make this very clear) problem may be how the company or engineer(s) or the pilot(s) comply with it.
tdracer:
References to the "Swiss Cheese" model for this accident are misplaced. This wasn't a case of the 'holes lining up' - the holes were aligned before this aircraft ever left the ground when they dispatched with insufficient fuel.
First of all you are contradicting yourself.
How can you explain "this wasn't a case of
the holes lining up vs
the holes were aligned ?
FYI the famous cheese model can start everywhere, from waking-up, entering head-quartars, meeting with the CEO/owner/engineer/cleaner/cabin-crew/refueler/first-officer/captain/ATC etc etc.....