So how many slices of Emmenthal do we have here?
- Forcing an aircraft on a route not suitable for it instead of sensibly planning a fuel stop;
- planning a flight not only without any of the legal reserve but even intending to use every last drop of fuel in the tanks (END = EET) and hoping for the best;
- the dispatcher and ATC accepting this flight plan;
- the crew not keeping an eye on the fuel state enroute and not using the opportunity to refuel at some enroute alternate;
- not calling "minimum fuel" or fuel emergency at the appropriate point;
- even when being sent into the holding due to another priority traffic, not clearly communicating ones situation to the controller.
Any of these "holes", had it been plugged, would have caused this flight to land more or less normally without any newsworthy occurrence or even the loss of any life, albeit in breach of several volumes of aeronautical regulations. They would likely just have taken up a bit more than 1000 liters of fuel and departed at some point.
And finally:
- possibly becoming overwhelmed by the aircrafts logical and expectable reactions to the consecutive flameouts of all engines;
- losing situational awareness.
Without these two, the aircraft might or might not have cleared that ridge and ended up impacting a more survivable area.
The CVR transcript will likely be extremely enlightening to read; the CRM practiced in that flight deck may well be a case study on how not to run an airliner...