Thanks Engines, I agree wholeheartedly with what you say and at my lowly level within the military and to a lesser extent within civilian aircraft industry as quality engineer, I used to try to the best of my ability to make sure I and my compatriots carried out the work to the highest possible standard, even though that was not a popular approach for the management, and some of my peers who considered promotion before airworthiness.
After leaving the service and working within a civilian maintenance organisation on a military contracts I have taken your list and amended to what happens within that arena I worked in:
1. Internal QA checks of documentation and aircraft carried out on the unit - about every 3 to 6 months - I and the other quality people did that
2. External audit by prime contractor if applicable on above, or contractors core quality team at least twice.
3. Once the MAA stood up an annual audit as above carried out.
4. Then the BMAR as per the RA posted carried out on each aircraft, then once the MARC issued this was then an annual check.
5. Input and output standards of aircraft and documentation every time an aircraft was transferred between sqn on entering/leaving maintenance.
The problems really started when the MAA sent their auditors out and tried to audit against regulations that they neither understood or followed themselves, and followed up by using CAA auditors which made the issues worse as the EASA regulations had been militarised by the MAA, hence things got even more complicated. I have been out of this area for a while now and would like to think things might improve.
And don't get me started on F765s, F760s and DASORs, at least on one platform we managed to work with all parties and immensely improve F765 turnround times.
To give an example of F760s, some of these used to go via a cell at Stafford, but we found out as Stafford was being run down the cell had gone, therefore all F760s went to Cosford training admin as they were temporary 'caretakers' during the draw down. Approached the military when Cosford contacted us and forwarded them on and they had no idea what to do with them, which probably explained why some things never got sorted.
Back to gliders, it would appear that this does display the systemic failures in the whole system and the inability of the MAA/Military management to fix things IAW their own regulations, which if they knew what they actually meant would be a start, I could be down to lost 'corporate memory' either through natural wastage, ignorance or deliberately.