I'm going to play devil's advocate here. This might not be about automation but about crew mental overload and loss of situational awareness due to an unexpected event ("startle").
I'm reminded of another 757 incident a few years back, in Olso, where the crew also completely botched what should've been a routine G/A procedure after an unstable approach.
The Captain (PF), flying manually with ATHR engaged, started to apply huge control column inputs. The 757 pitched to 21 degrees nose up, before the Captain reversed input and plunged the aircraft to an extreme -49 degrees nose down steep dive at low altitude.
With the GWPS blaring both pilots yanked their control columns back and they somehow recovered at just 321 ft radio altitude, 251 kts, after a sustained 3.59G pull. The 757 zoomed back up at 40 degrees nose up until they finally leveled off at 4,000 ft.
This routine G/A was botched in manual flight, and in fact in this case automation could have helped reduce the workload in a period of mental overload. In the Thomson Airways case it's also possible that the FO turned on the A/P in the middle of the go around because he was similarly overloaded and wanted help from the A/P.
So I think it's too easy to blame "automation". The problem to solve may be a bit more fundamental than that.