BEA management sat on two accident reports which involved degradation of performance due to contamination before the Munich accident.
IIRC One was Canadian and the other Dutch.
Three inquiries concentrated upon blaming the Germans, if you read the transcripts ( including the ones in German) you might get a better understanding.
The Staines inquiry included a back dated stall procedure, false testimony and lack of ANY of P2s course testimonies. This lack of evidence included the non inclusion of letters written by myself and my colleagues who had written to management.
Two of the captains I met last year had taken off directly before and after Key and stated that he had blocked the runway for several minutes.
You might "try" and obtain some of the testimonies under FOI.
An investigator told me that the simulator didn't handle as the aircraft did.
If you know anything about NA SOP then read the report....they were insane.
Finally and more relevant to my post about monitored approach procedures which is why I started this thread - BEAs procedures were NOT the wonderful system made out in the BA tail strike thread, Stan Key had obvious problems flying the Trident and I am quite sure that a better management would not have put the crew together and taken the warnings made by several captains before (and after) the crash.
I posted as I believe that speading knowledge and history may stop man from repeating itself.