BOAC monitored approach.
In the 60s BOAC had a terrible accident rate and they decided that a major shift in operating procedures was needed.
The main stay was that the first officer had to be equally trained and qualified as the captain to be able to realistically "monitor".
So when I went onto the VC 10 in 1978 I was in for a massive shock and nearly didn't make it. Gone were the days of carrying the captains bag and hinting that he was digging a massive hole...I actually had to make command decisions.
There were several noticeable steps in my education.
Reading an incident report at Hamble where a VC10 did a touch and go in a game park at night.
The next was around 1974 where a 747 did something similar but into a rubber plantation short of KL ...I first read about it in a Heathrow church, God bothering pamphlet; it was adorned with the offending captain, hat under his arm and the text was how God had saved him and lifted the Classic out of the plantation trees. The report stated that the copilot had been recommended for the sack because he didn't intervene during training when the captain got low and slow into LHR. At that stage of my career I wouldn't have dreamed about intervening.
So until I joined the Iron Duck fleet first officers had to do an apprenticeship which involved a Nav ticket (1 year) and a couple of years watching with the odd sector thrown in. To get around the 12 landings p.a. requirement and build up a core of young experienced pilots with a knowledge of training BOAC gave them an instructors rating course at Booker with the infamous Joan Hughes.
So my course in 1978 was to get the VC 10 in part 1 of my license.
This wasn't as simple as it seemed and was a massive step, not in handling but into thinking and acting like a professional pilot.
The first shock was the incredulous look on the captain, FO and FE faces when I asked the training captain if I could start the descent and subsequently to disconnect the autopilot. None of them had come across the flying pilot asking such foolish questions as unlike In BEA the captain would only sign your log book if I carried out ALL of the command decisions.
Later on the regular copilot got onto the HF after I had been unable to establish two way comms with Bombay and had been told to stop as it interfered with my monitoring. It was lucky that he did as we got very close to a TWA 747 crossing our track over the middle of the Bay of Bengal.
It wasn't all milk and honey though as our Dutch roll exercise was stopped at 30 degrees of bank "because a trainee put the wrong input in at 60 degrees) and I had a problem with a very strange flight control system that an instructor failed to pick up in an hour of circuits and bumps. As in the classroom there are many who do not have the teaching gift and cannot see the implications of distilling their own inadequacies into their subjects.
Such was the high standard expected from first officers that when I asked the captain to declare a mayday and told him that we were doing a 180 nothing was questioned.
So the BOAC monitored approach was that one pilot flew the aircraft down to minimums with a very competent pilot monitoring him who was able to criticise and either call for a go around of take over. The handling pilot did everything although the engineer did have a set of throttles. We flew it manual throttle which gave us a stable platform and we generally were fully established by 1,000'. - in a "heavy" - 2 1/2 times the weight of the Trident.
Incidentally I failed my final check as inside the OM at Jeddah we were unexpectedly given landing clearance on the parallel runway and the skipper thought I was landing too deep. My excuses were that I was suffering from salmonella poisoning - I had spent the last 18 hours on the loo - and I had never attempted nor trained the manoeuvre before.
The afore excuse is one of those things that one is expected to ignore but if it goes wrong as did with Glen Stewart one is hung out to dry.
Although we didn't know it in the flat earth society (BEA) the VC 10 had been carrying out CAT 2 autolands as long as the Trident.
These measures did the trick and the accidents virtually stopped overnight although there were some very lucky escapes but that is aviation.
BOAC or rather BALPA then gave British aviation type differential pay as the 747 fleet was grounded by BALPA for virtually the first two years until an agreement was negotiated. IIRC one of the negotiators was Norman Tebbit at the start of his political career. The engines were sold or hired to other operators at great profit whilst large concrete blocks were suspended from the pylons to stop the wings deforming.
I will post Swissair's procedures which is as unorthodox in some ways as BEA was but they hadn't fought a war and had money and talent to throw at the problem.