onetrack, excellent points.
Some very highly paid people in MoD (so the wrong people!) constantly wrestle with these problems but occasionally the likes of the Public Accounts Committee ask a good question that demands a back to basics assessment. This happened in 1999 when they issued a report "Modifying Defence Equipment". There were 6 test cases, only one of which delivered to time, cost and performance. Senior staff didn't know how to reply, because the procedures and regulations governing the subject had been cancelled, and money chopped.
But a short paper was submitted from the viewpoint of the one successful programme, breaking down the acquisition process into functions. Two things stood out. First, there were two key posts whose roles kept cropping up through-life. Every project needed them, constantly, but as a matter of policy they had been disestablished without being replaced. The one successful test case had, purely by chance, a programme manager who had carried out these roles in a previous life. The failures identified in the other five were directly attributable to this work not being done. Nothing was done because, as ever, for senior staff to endorse the recommendations would mean criticising their own past decisions.
The second was more an observation. The author thought Service personnel very pragmatic and tolerant of procurement problems (witnessed by many of the above posts) and opined that, when one broke down the serious moans and groans, the key was getting Ranging, Scaling, Documentation and Packaging right first time. (So much else falls out of this). It then pointed out that, unsurprisingly, one the the first things the abandoned Service HQ role (above) does is raise an RSD&P form. A simple form, the only real thought being the Maintenance Policy Statement, and a whole process kicks off. But, by disbanding one post and throwing the forms in the back of a 6x4, everything ground to a halt. Support staff throughout MoD and Industry suddenly had no tasking, this was construed as nothing to do, and posts were cut never to be replaced. You had stupid things happen, like very complex equipment bought, but no spares, test equipment, training or tech pubs. (Recognise this, front line?) Radios bought, with no antenna, because the postholder paid to spot such howlers no longer had a job.
Shortly before I retired I saw the effect of the last first hand. When they know you're going, you get the trouble shooting jobs which require you to upset people. (The MAA should learn this lesson). A unit, shortly to deploy, had been given their new comms kit, but no antennae. "Not in the URD" apparently, but it is rather implied when you buy a radio, as you have to test and trial it before acceptance. Or so you'd think. I was standing with the long haired CO and he took a call on his mobile. His Yeoman of Signals, on a day off, was at a boot sale. He'd spotted a Rhode and Schwartz broadband HF antenna, in good nick, for two grand. If he flashed his credit card, would mess funds cover it? No said the CO, but he personally would pay. (He knew he was going to lose men without it, another thing lost on the BCs). The next day YofS pitched up, took 10 minutes to erect the antenna, and all was well. A good example of COTS, because the Mil Spec was the same as the Civ spec. They returned 6 months later, no losses.