Back to the subject, re complacency #53.
Complacency, without elaboration does not identify any issues for improving safety or avoiding similar accidents.
Although this was a side excursion, there are many similarities with overruns, which the FAA are well aware of and hence TALPA. However, the FAA do not proposed to mandate TALPA recommendations, leaving the safety responsibility with operators and in turn with the crew.
Were previous efforts to improve landing distance calculation overruled by operators?
In comparison with Europe, US operations might appear to be complacent given the frequency of encountering similar operating conditions. EASA provides extensive advice on contaminated operations, the performance calculation (1) is one of a few sections of part 25 not copied by FAA; this AMC also has extensive operational advice and cautions (although not the best document for operational awareness).
EASA also supports the implementation of OLD - Operational Landing Distance, which is more relevant on contaminated runways than the 'actual' + factor distances favoured by Boeing.
Another significant difference is that European operators are advised to consider contaminated operations as 'non normal' requiring additional risk mitigation - larger performance margins, crew training/awareness; whereas (complacent) US operators appear to treat contamination as an everyday operation.
(1) CS 25 AMC1591