Best bit of banter and mud slinging for a while..all the elements of a internet bar brawl...this is what PPRUNE used to be like
Just a thought...CGS might just have missed the point about AH in his letter..a bit of a Torygraph trap me thinks!
NO WAH 64 D's deployed to Iraq - is he relying on the performance of the US AH 64D as a combat indicator for the future of Land Warfare? The very ones that had the **** kicked out of them by small arms fire, because they were called upon to perform tasks that the aircraft were not designed for. Lesson learned from Op Anaconda in Afghanistan....clearly not.
FCR's were relegated to the off position..ineffective against AK47's, technicals and too time consumming and complicated for the close battle. If you spend £38M on an integrated fire control system to enable stand off shock firepower at mass target arrays on the dense battlefield..and then ask it to hover OGE at 150ft AGL to cover a house search..you might need to ask wether or not you have just brought too much sophistication.
"working to update our thinking" Mmmmm, ok..then just what is the AH's central role on the battlefield, when the future threat is low intensity, urban and HMG & RPG's from kitchen windows. Where is the Army's doctrine for AH? How much thinking is needed..the cheque was handed over in 1996. Or is there just a tadge of..."just what are we going to do with this?"
AH will deliver "radical changes"....I would suggest that the suicide fanatical human bomber will be the driver for that. AH comes complete with FCR / RFI and very expensive RF Hellfire..radical..perhaps not. Give me the names of any Iraqi Air Defender's who turned scopes on! Not a long list I would suggest. Besides there are much more capable platforms whose job it is to execute that task (EF3 & EF 18 G). I for one could not think of a future conflict where sophisticated RF SAM / SPAAGs might be used. (OK..China, FSU or N. Korea..I will give you those). So have we procured a dated capability that might prove to be a "costly mistake"?
"Light, fast moving intervention forces"..to self deploy the AH will require ferry tanks..ferry tanks on..weapons off..arrive in Monrovia to support SF / Peacekeepers..err..sorry JFComd need to wait for the ship or C17 with killing thingy's on board..but have a gun though. AH is a "HEAVY" weapon system / platform..a Harrier with rotor blades. Lots of motion lotion required and lots of ammo. Its why the US Marines did not want it, US SF avoid it and why it is organic to US Divisonal CONOPS and Div Logistics. This is why 16 Special Needs Bde do not understand it and the Army must realise IT must support it...the AAC can only fly it.
Carry on with the banter..but you cannot avoid the end state..if the AH is to return its investment..it must become a tri-service asset..with full joint communications, joint logistics and joint operations. The AAC must stop trying to emulate the GPR, become proffessional (and not just act with professionalism..there is a subtle difference) and therefore become central in operating the AH, in any future tri-service organisation (JAHF)....if it is to survive this decade.
Digging in now.......
