Without knowing the crew's thoughts, it's almost impossible to understand why the crew acted as they did; any other view is supposition.
However, generic answers might be identified by taking a wider view. We normally act as we see a situation, where perception is an amalgamation of sensed information and that stored in memory. Thus actions can be influenced by how something is sensed and what we have experienced before; this is the basis of training, - how to influence behaviour for future activity.
Thus we might improve our understanding of accidents by identifying potential contributory factors.There is no certainty that these were influential in this accident, but by considering possible effects, then other events might be avoidable.
In this accident. What was simulated, how; how checklists are formed and used, and threat knowledge.
Did UAS simulation just remove the airspeed display; or were all the effects of an ADC system malfunction on other systems accurately represented - the surprise factor - no simple clue to the problem.
Did the checklist have a condition statement before memory items; 'if an emergency then memory items', if not, read the followup actions. An 'emergency' is subjective according to experience.
If the checklist was drafted to differentiate the dynamics of a situation - takeoff, climb, descent, cruise, then the cruise condition would not require memory action, only the followup items. Had that aspect been trained, was the training related to the real threat (ICI), did the crew, simulator, operator know.
Did operational procedures require the Captain (P1) to handle the aircraft in an emergency; thus the basis of the PM's experience was only by reading the check list. Were the followup items considered; shortage of simulator time, handling more important than reading lists. Would a PM gain sufficient experience to qualify as a relief PF, enabling judgement of an emergency, and in handling the aircraft with abnormal feel.
It is difficult to answer these questions based on what has been reported about this accident, but we can look at current activities to learn about what happens now, and perhaps avoid similar incidents.
It is also essential to continue questioning, to consider any other influencing factors.
Why require refresher training for UAS; the threat was ice crystals. It would be more logical to train avoidance of CBs - ICI, radar handling, calculating larger miss distances, threat knowledge; opposed to reactive actions for UAS, which should have already been trained in basic training.
None of this requires AoA; except a gauge of how we think about accidents.