Whether jet-transport pilots should have an AoA indicator or not - and I must admit I'm inclined to think that they should, even if it is only to be used as a last resort for stall diagnosis in the event of loss-of-control following UAS - the issue remains of the perceived validity of AoA indications when the IAS is genuinely lower than that needed for sustained flight.
When the AD design team for Airbus FBW at Saint Martin-du-Touch (?) decided in the mid-1980s to opt for invalidating AoA data at IAS < 60 kt (assuming my memory serves), were they:
(1) just playing safe, i.a.w. normal engineering practice;
and/or
(2) influenced by the assumption that such an airspeed would only be indicated when the a/c was on the ground, and the vanes on either side of the fuselage would therefore be susceptible to crosswind and shielding effects (for want of a better description).
In any case, the possibility of a large jet transport achieving a genuine IAS of less than 60 kt when airborne, even with the grossest mishandling, seems too remote to merit consideration. However, one would have to consider the reliability of the AoA vanes in conditions that had already caused UAS due to freezing of pitot-head(s).