vilas, ' nothing more to milk'; depends what you look for, what you have learnt or are prepared to learn.
Any 'new' aspects may be far removed from the previous discussion on what happened or AoA displays.
However, there is one related aspect of AoA which the regulators / manufacturers may be considering.
Most commercial aircraft use AoA for stall warning and identification; a key area is where these functions are not available. Conventional warning and identification is not required in envelope 'protected' aircraft, but with the unavailability of that protection, the alternative warnings / alerts may not be as good as standard systems, e.g. stick shake / stick push are more effective than a voice call.
Whilst any of these systems might not be available during some extreme speed excursions, they are normally available during the approach to and transition from safe flight to an upset, i.e. the avoidance - preventative functions still work.
The particular issues in this accident were the 'immediate loss of protection', voice stall warning, and no equivalent stick push. These were compounded by trim interaction.
Safety solutions may consider retaining the protections longer during a malfunction, and/or strengthening alternative alerting; enhancements to speed awareness are already in place.
All of the above are preventative, - avoidance; whereas the recent suggestions to use pure AoA displays are reactive.
The reactive approach requires good situation awareness and recognition so that an appropriate course of action can be considered - use AoA display. Unfortunately, as in this accident, if crews have insufficient awareness or understanding to appreciate an audio stall alert or consider attitude to effect a recovery, then a new AoA display may not be any more effective.
Look for the assumptions in change proposals. Also see surprise and cognitive workload as discussed in Emirates 777 thread.
As for other lessons, look further afield. Every day CRM for storm avoidance, UAS checklist and training, methods of simulation, and as to why additional refresher training was required at all; what was the alternative.