Although the thread title cites 'Pilot Error', the NTSB did not state that, neither as a conclusion or probable cause.
However, their discussion did identify several decisions that, with hindsight were less than optimal. Several contributing factors were considered, but most aspects focused on the evolving event and reactive safety solutions.
Is it standard for US operators to use calculated landing distances up to the limiting value. And then being dependent on the accuracy of the reported runway condition, touchdown position and speed, and the availability of reverse. Also would this consider if the landing data provided sufficient margins, crew additives, or even if it considerd the lower EPR thrust reverse.
Many (non US) operators are believed to consider the next lower runway condition and the use of manual brake which provides 'a bit more' than autobrake; this may alleviate some of the PIREP bias and a changed, or inadequately reported runway condition.
The crew having identified an unexpected runway state and knowing that performance was inadequate, continued the landing. The lack of GA puts this accident in the HF area.
Yet the NTSB recommendations consider more/enhanced piloting actions on the runway as a defence, checking, and calls (automated). But in this accident the errant high EPR was identified, called, and corrected, yet control was still lost. Will new procedures change this?
Ref requiring on-board equipment to determine real time braking action may be of limited value. The 'first aircraft' to land may still be at risk of an overrun. Furthermore if every aircraft retarding device was already in use, then what more could the crew could do in the event of an alert. Any device could only generate a reactive safety warning, still relying on pilots' predictive abilities.
Has the NTSB missed the point, or have I overlooked something.