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Old 22nd Sep 2016, 15:38
  #46 (permalink)  
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Muddling about monitored approaches

Since this thread seems to be drifting anyway.....
There's often muddled thinking about lots of issues regarding "monitored approaches". I use the term Skybrary term "PicMA", partly because just "monitored approach" can be taken to imply that the "traditional" PF/PM flying doesn't include monitoring, which obviously it does.

The case for using PicMA for all routine IFR approaches, not just "when needed", is the same as preparing for an engine failure on every takeoff - you just can't tell in advance when it will be needed. If you've only prepared for a nice sunny day and reality turns sour, s**t happens. Many accident reports prove this, and they ALWAYS blame the crew. UPS 1354 crew for example "expected to be visual at 1000ft aal". But if you're prepared for the worst and it turns out to be a lovely day, nothing's lost.

Similarly there are lots of accidents in "good" conditions where monitoring has broken down - the PM has recognised that the situation is unsatisfactory (e.g. high / fast ) but been unable to convince the PF, who has the higher effective authority, and got caught between the need to help the PF who believes the problem can be resolved, and his/her own judgment that in fact it won't be solved in time. Either could be correct, but the PM's view is fail-safe (safe if wrong), the PF's is fail-dangerous. In a PicMA the PM definitely has the authority to impose the safer option. See post 33 this thread! It's very easy and facile to be smug and say "should have applied better CRM, it wouldn't have happened to me". OK, congratulations, but most of us are a bit more fallible.

The smart way to look at this issue is that you want to standardise on a default operation for the worst risks (which relate to visual transition) and build in flexibility to deal with other real world factors. PicMA operations optimise the IFR approaches which are where public transport risks are highest. So a "best practice" application would start by assuming it's going to be a worst case - rubbish visibility to DH, F/O flying to DH and G/A if needed, Captain takes control when satisfied landing is safe.

The worst case won't actually occur most of the time, so the intelligent way is then to allow your crews (especially Captains) to be professionals and allow the control change at a higher altitude when appropriate. That may well apply with the "strong crosswind but good visibility scenario. For example the following would cover the "good vis but howling gusty crosswind scenario: "At the Captain's discretion, he/she may resume control above DH/MDA provided
a) the aircraft is established on final approach in stable landing configuration,
b) the probability of a go-around due to inadequate visual reference is nil (e.g. touchdown point is visible), and
c) the probability of a go-around due to other factors is low (e.g. runway clear etc).

Another muddled issue is "F/Os won't get experience/ role reversal" etc. There's absolutely no logical reason why using PicMA as your standard everyday procedure should inhibit this in any way. The distribution of T/Os and landings etc. can be identical to that using traditional PM/PF flying. Many traditional operators write the PF duties under the title "Captain" and the PM duties under "First Officer" or "co-pilot", and no-one says that means F/Os can't do takeoffs and landings there. What certainly does happen in PicMA based operation is that if you have Captains who don't give legs away, their F/Os may not get landings but they do get pretty good at shooting approaches because they get to do a lot of them!
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