I agree that the logic and inputs related to RAAS alerts need to be looked at hard to avoid unnecessary Go Arounds. But no matter how well the RAAS functions, the fact remains that a Go Around attempt should
never result in gear up ground contact. Had the flight crew verified power lever position and/or manually moved the power levers rather than relying completely on the automatics, the go around would have been successful and this disaster averted. Particularly unsettling to me is that the TOGA switches on a B777 are right in front of the tops of the power levers (see photo below). How the pilot can press the TOGA switches and not feel the levers stay stationary and not advancing is beyond me. Clearly he was trained very differently than I. To me, the main lesson learned here is that flight crews need to be trained how to aviate without resort to automatics, and taught to always verify what the automatics are doing, ESPECIALLY when they are in proximity to the ground and/or at low airspeeds. And on Boeing products I believe they should be taught to verify what the automatics are doing tactilely (feel is a very instinctive feedback) because on Boeing products (unlike Airbus products) the flight/thrust controls always move to reflect what the automatics are doing. (NOTE: I'm NOT saying the "Boeing way" is "better". I'm just saying that since tactile feedback is available on Boeing aircraft, flight crew should be trained to make use of that tactile feedback.)
