The so-called "British Airways Flight Operations Department Notice" is a fabrication from the mid 1970s created by a BOAC pilot, who circulated it in a slightly different format as part of an unsuccessful campaign against the merger of BOAC, BEA and several other smaller carriers into British Airways. I have all the original files from that period.
Rather than "wacko", a balanced and more comprehensive description can be found on the respected Eurocontrol / ICAO / Flight Safety Foundation Skybrary site,
Monitored Approach - SKYbrary Aviation Safety.
The NTSB said in a 2000 accident report that "the monitored approach method provides for more effective monitoring by the non-flying pilot because captains are more likely to be comfortable offering corrections or challenges to first officers than the reverse situation. ............ Monitored approaches decrease the workload of the flying pilot and increase flight crew interaction, especially when experienced captains monitor and prompt first officers during the execution of approaches."
It's also likely that for example UPS 1354 pilots Capt. Cerea Beal and F/O Shanda Fanning would still be alive if they had been using this procedure. It is specifically designed to protect against many of the contributory factors in that accident, particularly having both pilots "head-up" seeking visual cues as the aircraft approaches DH. This weakness in traditional procedures was recognised in NTSB studies going back as far as 1976. There's much more about these issues on the picma.org.uk website.
However, can I suggest that since the IFR approach procedures used probably did not greatly affect this particular accident, this thread would benefit from concentrating on the issues of contaminated runways, braking action reporting, and aircraft design/handling issues that were actually involved?