Is this accident indicative of the US system?
The crew appeared to be under some HF pressure, a desire to land. And even with some doubt about landing performance the approach was continued.
"If there is doubt, ... then there is no doubt, don't do it."
The crew had poor information about the runway condition and braking action; yet the FAA has issued endless guidance (ACs) after TALPA on how and what to report, the role (and danger) of PIREPS, and for the industry to reconsider landing performance.
Has anything changed?
Dependence on PIREPS, dependance on reverse thrust, friction measurement (not universally accepted as accurate), and the use of 'actual' landing performance - with minimum additional factors (was this Boeing or third party data?).
Assuming that the landing performance included credit for reverse, was this using max reverse or the recommended lower value to be used on a contaminated runway?
http://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/m...5-32_Final.pdf
http://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/m...r/AC_91_79.pdf
P.S. neville, a good craftsman works with the tools s/he is given. Don't blame the aircraft; consider the conditions of how and where it was used