M.Mouse
Clearly you do not fly either the B777 or B777.
You are right, I neither fly the B777 nor the B777
However, my point is type-independant.
M.Mouse
... and the autothrottle system handles the power extremely well and, in gusty conditons especially, arguably far better than the PF could hope to do.
Except once in AMS. And except once in SFO. And except once in DXB. We don't need speed control on the knot, what we need is never speed dropping 20kt below bug unnoticed for 20 sec, or never going around with just pushing inhibited buttons.
Didn't the crew of the lost BA A319 cowling in LHR have problems flying without ATHR since they never did it before outside of the simulator? I certainly didn't want to have my first ATHR off approach under the stress of an abnormal.
alf5071h
During takeoff the crew focus is on power and speed, the task is to fly.
During a GA the task has to be quickly reformulated from the landing objective; PF has to fly, PM select flaps, check FMS, FMA, and hearing, noting, and responding to ATC clearance ... and verifying that the thrust is set.
A 10-12 sec delay in identifying the unexpected AT operation might be reasonable given the workload and behavioual influences.
And as much as the manufacturer, regulator, management, (or some Ppruners) might expect the crew to recall the FCOM notes on page 4.29.17. line 12, or the textural rejected landing procedure, humans, pilot's do not function that way, particularly in very rare and surprising situations, where procedures have been actioned correctly, ... with a minor oversight which subsequently appears to have been identified, but a little too late.
I strongly agree. In certain dynamic situations it is impossible to absorb all the indications from the FMA fast enough, it just doesn't work. That is why we need more hands on work. KISS, keep it simple stupid.
Manual flight equals manual thrust would have prevented this accident. As it would have many more. Pilots need to be in the loop, speed scanning MUST become second nature again, for all crews, not just for most.
alf5071h
This is an 'as designed' situation, with opportunity for misleading system operation, and probably with the gross assumption that the crew will manage error avoidance, detection, and mitigation: in a time scale much shorter than it takes to read this post.
Pilots have a responsibility for safety, but just because they are the last line of defence, their responsibility does not include the responsibilities of those who have much more time and influence to consider the situation; the regulators, manufacturers, and operator.
Strongly agree. It would not have happened if AFS-mode-selection was designed into the thrust levers itself as it is with Airbus.
Didn't AF in CDG have an incident with the B777 TL-button design? Instead of TOGA buttons they pressed ATHR disconnect buttons and advanced the TL manually, so the plane kept following the glide while accelerating close to the ground. AFS-mode-selection within the TL-itself would just be much more intuitiv.