notapilot, The objective of my post #1475 was to generate thought about contributing factors, it was not intended to preempt any report. Actually this type of thinking does not require a report, just a trigger to consider safety issues from a range of perspectives, individual, operator, manufacturer, or regulator, irrespective of their involvement in this accident. It would be even more beneficial if we can suppress hindsight bias, avoid using outcome knowledge to infer cause.
Many posts continue to focus on training and procedures; this line of thought still infers blame; the human is broken, fix it, like mending a machine.
The alternative requires industry to reconsider safety thinking. This type of accident isn't caused, it emerges from 'normal' operations; they are surprising events, particularly to management, manufacturers, and regulators, because the overall system did not work as intended - our assumptions about human performance in the context of the man-machine-environment, were incorrect. In effect these types of accident are designed into the system, again, by all of us.
Lonewolf, pitch+power=, yes a classic, but if the context of operation is changed (man-machine-environment) then the value of such fundamentals can also change, even weakened beyond relevance. Does the industry 'know' if pilots look at pitch vs using FDs. Similarly with dependency on auto-thrust, 'power' may not have the same piloting relationship.
C_Twitcher, yes the latent 'factor' may still be lurking; even though we have knowledge of this accident, the risk of a further event is unchanged.
Re RAAS, it's now several hours since posting a RAAS question in Tech Log. Is the absence of replies indicative of the level of system knowledge for a major safety system installed in many aircraft, ... or does limited knowledge generate safety weakness if inappropriately employed.