I tend to agree with RAT 5, in so far as, I believe this crew could have, like many, been set up to fail here.
Just a point of information. At my employer, PF does NOT operate reversers! That is a job for PM. That simple fact allows me to pre-brief that PF does not remove their hand from the thrust levers unless they are happy we can stop, AND PM does not select reverse unless they are also happy we can safely stop. Either pilot can call go-around. We both have a very immediate investment, and clear responsibility, in the landing! ONLY when reverse is selected, are we committed to completing the landing! Not before.
At which point in the brief, a quick resume of HOW we would conduct a go-around after landing is included. It's debatable whether I would have thought such a briefing relevant before landing on a 4000m runway. However, we land on short runways so frequently that the 'how' is always reasonably fresh in the mind. Coincidentally I did one in the sim a month or so ago, and I think it may have been part of that recurrent?
I can see that Airbus has a more robust procedure for this particular manouvre. I can also see that something they do differently would have gone some way to mitigating what occurred here. It was always hammered into me on the Airbus that go-around thrust is selected, (which on the Airbus ALWAYS requires you to fully advance the thrust levers!) and flap is retracted one stage. THE NEXT STEP IS TO READ OUT LOUD THE FMAs! If they annunciate what you want to see, (would be THR/TOGA/TOGA on a Boeing) THEN gear is raised!
Incidentally, you can go-around quite easily with the gear down. Ask me how I know! But as we saw here, you can't go-around if the FMAs aren't correct!!
I would suggest to expect a recommendation to the manufacturer to include FMAs at a very early stage in all go-arounds. This simple change could have mitigated our colleagues incorrect actions. It helps to protect us all.
Last edited by 4468; 13th Sep 2016 at 10:45.