The TOGA switches are disabled by height during any landing. They cease to function at 2 feet above the runway and remain disabled until the airplane spends several seconds above 15 feet in any subsequent climb.
That seems odd design. What happens when RA fails like TK1951? When the airplane gets several seconds above 15 feet, is the TOGA button really necessary any more (except for the next approach)? Why did Boeing think TOGA should be disabled at all and now looking at these consequences maybe they will reconsider?
A simple voice alert of 'No TOGA' would inform the crew that their request for TOGA was not implemented by the automatics
Wouldn't some warning indeed be useful? So a button in some circumstances does absolutely nothing and doesn't tell pilots such a critical function is deactivated if they try to use it. But of course...
The point is the increase in thrust is absolutely critical for a go around or a rejected landing. The pilots should NEVER assume the thrust has increased but should ALWAYS verify. That is a part of the procedure.
Perhaps the training on this should include a deactivated TOGA button even at "minimums" to emphasise immediately verifying thrust increase.
A nice handy TOGA button that sometimes doesn't work is something to be very wary of.