Excellent contribution alf5071h. The supreme irony is that if the GA was initiated by pushing TOGA in the flare prior to touchdown that everything would have worked exactly as the crew expected and that aircraft would still be flying today. This latent thread would still be lurking, just waiting for the holes to line up next time.
Your highlighting of the RAAS, and how to deal with this warning is for me the key to this accident. This system seems to have caused confusion, if you look at the timeline I posted in post
#1391 it was only 4 seconds from the RAAS callout until the aircraft became airborne. It would seem the PF reacted promptly to this callout.
The next aspect is the many contributions on this thread for a rejected landing / baulked approach. The many terms, and techniques again highlight the
confusion for a GA after the wheels have touched down & prior to reverse being selected. There seems to be no "standard" technique, and Boeing manuals are very short on advice. Given this, how does the PM "know" how to react to one of these varieties of techniques and calls and resolve his own thinking about what is going on? Would the next Captain have ignored the RAAS callout in the same circumstances? If so, now the PM has to change his thinking to considering the level of braking action required and stopping distance remaining. There has to be a very quick change in thinking and both pilots have to be on the same page together to complete their task to avoid an accident.
This type of missed approach is quite rare, but a high risk manoeuvre given it appears to have virtually no standard training across the industry.