The problem of identifying a common drill reflects the widening gap between certification requirements and operational need.
Every aircraft can have a 'normal recovery technique' (FAR / CS 25.202, c, 3), where 'normal' may be type or manufacturer specific.
Operators seek similarity and consistency across aircraft types to reduce cost and avoid 'negative transfer' in training (N.B. protected vs unprotected aircraft).
Then there are segments of the industry which chase the last accident, attempting to develop techniques and training for unique circumstance - e.g. issues of trim and thrust.
A compounding problem is that accident reporting, or readers' interpretations, often focus on the outcome - loss of control. The preceding events, operational situations, and other contributing factors can be overlooked, and thence the opportunity to consider avoidance or mitigating actions.
Fortunately the widespread enthusiasm for 'after the event' upset training is now being refocused on avoidance, possibly due to the realisation that it is impossible to train 'every' situation, or appropriately represent all scenarios, and above all overcome the limitation of simulation - that there is no real fear (surprise) in a simulator.
Whilst I would not disagree with the general proposals being discussed, it is important to consider context. Those aspects which are required to be demonstrated in certification may not cover all scenarios which pilots appear to be able to encounter in operation; the industry needs to acknowledge the gap between what is assumed to happen, certification, and what actually happens in operation. This also involves recovery techniques.
An alternative to requiring compliance at 'accident' extremes, or providing training for the fallible human, is to consider the benefits of avoiding the situations, which are closely related to the gross assumption in most procedures - that the pilot understands the situation.
First is the aircraft stalled, what are the cues.
What is the trim position relative to the flight condition, how is this determined.
Centre the ball - lateral acceleration indication; rarely used, engine failure or not at all with automatic compensation.
Roll to the nearest horizon; crews may not normally use the blue / brown horizon thus it's difficult to determine the nearest horizon with a high nose up attitude. Alternatively, use the roll (sky) pointer, but again rarely used as attention is often centralised on the aircraft symbol; worse still the dominance of FD use may create the expectation of a FD recovery.
If this is a likely scenario, then training for stall recovery may also have to teach pilots a new way of flying in that situation; often misinterpreted as the loss of basic skills!