And in a punitive culture like this ME company seems to be, the Captain was probably thinking about the report or the visit to the office, from the very first second of the "incident" - thus hampering his accident-resolution capabilities
recceguy, if i may, i'd like to add to this point...
In my humble, FWIW, SOP's are removing airmanship qualities from the airman. The reason i believe this is happening, is because it makes it "easier" to recruit and train a procedures person. The art of flying, sadly, seems to have been reduced to a sodding flow chart. i.e. If X happens, do Y. (whilst trying but failing miserably to cover all eventualities).
An airman is constantly evaluating his/her environment and reacting, sometimes with subtly, other times less so, to the information fed back, with airmanship decisions, whereas Flow Chart SOP culture seems to relieve the airman of his decision making capabilities, and it's proving to be a dangerous direction the industry is going in. And here in this accident, it would seem, there is an SOP that says x has happened so do y.... and they're never even trained to do y!
They probably had at a guess, 6,000 successful landings between them and 0 baulked landings... And the Flow Chart SOP said "Run along and do something you have never done before because in the authors' opinion, it's the safest thing to do, whether you've been trained for it or not". And then yes, would have gotten a rollicking for adding another landing to their total rather than completing the manoeuvre the SOP called for.
Add to this, the fact that it appears that this mentality has developed into an acceptance, that flow chart SOP and automated equipment go hand in hand to enhance safety. I think that this direction is somewhat misguided.
So i wonder if, in this case, the thought really was about tea and biscuits or if it was, in fact, x has happened i must do y!!!