PukinDog,
Great post. Given the timeline as published, it’s highly likely that much of what you theorise actually happened.
I think we’re seeing the result of a procedure that is a mixture of memory/reflex items and ones that need thought/decision being performed without much cognition. Probably learnt behaviour as that worked on every other occasion and the training environment didn’t emphasise the procedure nor close the feedback loop by checking if it was being executed correctly. Both the PF and PM in this accident appear to be operating in this manner.
There is much concentration on mode awareness, technical knowledge, etc. but I think the most important fact, which seems to have eluded the crew here, is that when you’ve got the yoke in one hand and the thrust levers in the other, you are in control of the aeroplane and its performance, just like the basic aircraft you learned to fly on. That such primacy can be overcome by long-term exposure to contemporary airline operations shows the magnitude of the problem.