Hello dozy,
Forgive me: As I often find with your posts, I am never sure whether you are agreeing or disagreeing, or whether you simply enjoy countering other people's points of view? (i.e. winding us pilots up !?
)
The answer is not to develop more and more computers to take over from the pilots
No-one directly involved with the tech side ever claimed it was. The notion that FBW/digital flight controls plus FMC/autoflight was the first step in replacing pilots was purely an invention of the press.
Straw man argument: the OP was claiming this, and I was responding to the OP. Perhaps I could have phrased it more tidily by saying "the answer is not to develop
a computer to think ahead.........."
Autothrust, for example, removes the need to constantly monitor and adjust the aircraft speed.
That's not an especially new thing though - it's been a part of line flying since the '60s.
Another straw man: How does the fact that autothrust has been around for quite a while render my point invalid?
Then, one day, you get pilots who have not done 'proper' groundschool to fully understand their systems; have not practised flying with manual thrust;..
You're talking about two different things there.........
Yes I am, and they are directly related in this crash, so how does that nullify my point? It was a non understanding of the A/T HOLD mode coupled with a reluctance - or lack of ability - to monitor speed and take over and use manual thrust, that was the main cause of this crash.
Yes, they were too high all the way down the approach. Yes, the two other captains in that cockpit failed to properly alert or take control from the obviously very senior but incompetant Captain. (the {non flying} F/O was the only one who spoke up until it was far too late).
Since the advent of the widebodies in the late '60s and early '70s, we're talking about airliners with a degree of complexity such that they're on the very limit of what human beings are capable of dealing with (case in point, a couple of years back I walked through the flight deck of a static B741 exhibit and the sheer number of switches, CBs and gauges blew my mind - those FEs got a silent salute out of me that day!). The reason that later aircraft systems design moved towards computer management and monitoring of those systems is because the complexity grew to such a degree that it was too much to ask of flight crew (and because that kind of work is something computers - when programmed correctly - are very good at).
Setting and monitoring the correct thrust and speed is not a complex task, nor is it a difficult one. It can be tedious to do for long sectors (In my past I have flown five types without autothrust), and is legally necessary for CAT lll autolands.
Don't be too overawed by the FEs panels of yesteryear. I have a background and previous life in electronics, so it is easy for me to see; but each part was quite simple, there were just a lot of parts ! A bit like music mixing desks you might have seen in recording studios: they look insanely complex to the novice but they really are not. (Last night every passenger who visited the flight deck as they boarded were in awe at the cockpit: "Wow do you know what every switch and light does?" etc.)
...and fly with the autopilot engaged so often; that they literally sit and allow the speed to decay to 30 knots slow on approach without doing anything about it, and just watch as their aircraft crashes around them !
In all fairness, pilots have been "falling behind" their aircraft for far longer than autoflight has been around. If you're referring to Asiana into SFO, I think it's fair to point out that poor training and a series of CRM blunders were involved well before the automation mix-up came into the picture.
I am trying to understand how the fact that "pilots have been falling behind their aircraft for far longer than autoflight has been around" nullifies my point? You point out that poor training was to blame as if I hadn't thought of that, but this was one of the points I made.
And, yes, I was referring to Asiana. I do agree there were CRM issues and other factors in this accident; because as we all know; any accident is never caused by a single hole in the cheese. Having said that, a proper understanding of the A/T system modes would have 'converted' this crash into a hot and high approach. Not pretty, or proper, but the landing (or go around) would have been reasonably OK and ?five people would not have died.
Regards.