Originally Posted by
atpcliff
My whole airline didn't know how the auto throttles worked. Our manuals, approved by the FAA, and our training, told us that with the Autothrottles ON, we would be speed protected. We didn't know about this autothrottle (non-speed protection) mode until the SFO accident.
The above is a MAJOR problem. Boeing knew how the system worked, but didn't communicate that effectively to my airline.
The NTSB report on Asiana OK214 flagged the issue of the crew's poor understanding of the airplane’s autoflight system as a contributing factor (Finding 10. As a result of complexities in the 777 AFCS and inadequacies in related training and documentation, the pilot flying had an inaccurate understanding of how the autopilot flight director system and autothrottle interacted to control airspeed, which led to his inadvertent deactivation of automatic airspeed control.)
The NTSB recommended that the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA):
- Require Boeing to develop enhanced 777 training that will improve flight crew understanding of autothrottle modes and automatic activation system logic through improved documentation, courseware, and instructor training.
- Once the enhanced Boeing 777 training has been developed, as requested in Safety Recommendation, require operators and training providers to provide this training to 777 pilots.
- Require Boeing to revise its 777 Flight Crew Training Manual stall protection demonstration to include an explanation and demonstration of the circumstances in which the autothrottle does not provide low speed protection.
The NTSB also recommended that Boeing:
- Revise your 777 Flight Crew Operating Manual to include a specific statement that when the autopilot is off and both flight director switches are turned off, the autothrottle mode goes to speed (SPD) mode and maintains the mode control panel-selected speed.
When that report was released two years ago, the FAA and Boeing danced around those recommendations such that they are currently classified as "Open - Unacceptable Response" on the NTSB register.
Interestingly, in noting the FAA's inaction as unacceptable, the NTSB stated that they were "...
concerned that training improvements will be unnecessarily delayed and that the “lessons learned” will be limited to a single airline’s analysis, that neither the FAA nor other Boeing 777 operators will be aware of the problems found, and that no resultant training revisions will be made."
That was December 2014; 18 months later on a hot August day in Dubai and the NTSB's concerns seem to be prescient given what probably transpired.