Originally posted by PEI 3721
...just because a 20 yr old design was approved does not mean that the assumptions made then hold true today. Operators and individuals are very good at adapting to 'small problems', and formalise their workarounds with more training.
The point I was trying to make is that the TOGA inhibit function and its ramifications is NOT some hitherto unidentified problem that has suddenly sprung up out of nowhere. Rightly or wrongly, the aircraft was purposely designed that way to prevent the accidental activation of TOGA after touchdown. Given that we have now had two occurrences where the inhibit function
may have been a factor (SQ in Munich, EK in Dubai), then perhaps a rethink is needed.
The inhibit function is documented in the aircraft's FCOM, but it seems that some operators have procedures that cover rejected landings and some don't. Some operators train their pilots in those procedures and some don't. Why is that so? Why haven't ALL operators adopted the same procedures and trained their pilots accordingly?