I have some serious doubts that "the machine" is the issue. In the past 20 years, what has changed more: how the industry prepares pilots to fly, or the machines themselves?
Well said.
The B777's TOGA inhibit function has been with us for a long time. It was designed and certified that way for a reason, over 20 years ago. Some airlines recognised the 'problem' many years ago and have trained their pilots accordingly. My employer has been doing it for over 10 years and the associated procedures are in our B777 FCOM. Why aren't other airlines doing the same? You can hardly blame the aircraft if the pilots that fly it haven't been properly trained.
We train V1 cuts, missed approaches from the minima and other 'canned' manoeuvres until the cows come home. Perhaps it's about time airline training started to incorporate some of the other, less traditional, 'events' that are likely to catch people out? How about engine failures at other points during the take-off profile, eg during rotate, V2, thrust reduction? Missed approaches from somewhere other than the minima, eg on the runway (rejected landing), from an altitude above the missed approach altitude? The assumption has always been that a pilot who is competent at flying a V1 cut or a missed approach from the minima will be well prepared for these other types of events. That may have been true once upon a time, when aircraft were much less sophisticated. It is not true nowadays, when there is much more reliance on automatic systems and their various idiosyncrasies. Aircraft design has moved on in leaps and bounds. Have our training/checking systems kept up?