safetypee,
I perfectly understand your reasoning it's just that the implementation sometimes isn't as straight forward as the engineering, both hardware and software, would want it to be.
reduce complexity, aid consistency
Unfortunately this scenario has resulted in highly complex machines with a vast plethora of integrated systems which all rely upon each other with varying degrees of redundancy to mitigate for the inadequacies of the human mind.
As Tesla have demonstrated, where both the cars automated systems and the driver failed to detect a scenario which hadn't been anticipated by either the software designers or the hardware designers, the result was the loss of the drivers life. I am aware that Tesla state that the automation is in Beta but seriously? How far do we let the automation go?
Aircraft are seriously complex pieces of machinery. I like simplicity, it makes my day to day life easier and enables me to fly the sometimes ludicrous duty times I fly. However the increased tendency to 'hide' complexity and system cross over from the operating crew has a darker side. If the technical knowledge isn't there as to the cascade effect that a singular system failure might precipitate then the workload on the flight crew at a time of high stress will also increase. Complex systems presenting simple information should never replace the innate ability of those designated to 'fly' the machine from performing their job. We are rapidly approaching a point where the systems cascade of multiple failures or, even in the case of a single failure (AF), might cause sensory and capacity overload in under trained and overwhelmed crews.
The reason we have SOP's is simply to allow people who often have never flown before together to be able to work as a team and to realistically expect to get a standardised product from your colleague. Irrespective of what seat they might occupy.
Ironically the FMA purely supplies the information to the pilot as to exactly what mode the Autopilot system is in thus ensuring that the modes you've selected on the MCP are the actual modes the A/P is giving you! It's not an additional check more of an affirmation.
As the previous couple of posts here have alluded to the question here is WHY did the aircraft not climb adequately after what should have been a routine manoeuvre albeit with ground contact. Was there a failure of the A/T system? Did the engines fail to spool due to an EEC fault/logic problem or, more simply, did the crew fail to remember that the TOGA switches are inhibited after touchdown? A simple check of the FMA by the NHP would have seen that the A/T system was not in TOGA in that case.
So whilst I agree that simplicity is best we simply cannot ignore that we must train the next generation of pilots to understand that it is an aeroplane and as such they must also understand that occasionally it might need to be flown like one without the bells and whistles.