There are several aspects in this thread, all of which might contribute to an accident, but perhaps none in isolation.
Speculation about accidents requires a wider view; not just a question of if pilots know how the guidance system works or not, or know and forget, or misjudge the situation, or just follow SOPs. Or if the system design, operation, or training are inconsistent, or overly complex in rare or unexpected circumstances.
There are assumptions behind all of these aspects; why the system was designed so, the expectations for use, consideration of human performance and limitations, likelihood of encountering situations.
As an example, there are sound arguments for using automation during the approach (AT, FD) and for standardising operations, but it is unlikely that these can accommodate every scenario in increasingly complex and high tempo operations. Thus if training focuses on always following SOPs, and the SOP is to select TOGA, then the policy must account for, or accept situations where the required actions will deviate from the standard. This implies that the policies, training programs, documents and practical training must similarly involve a common understanding of the system and operation.
There can be many viewpoints for solutions and conflict resolution, some may involve a specific scenarios, or training, or policy, but none (I venture) will be without assumption and compromise. Safety improvements will require that several aspects be addressed simultaneously; I.e. reconsider the design, the content or policy of SOPs. Undertake wider investigations of an apparent increase in bounced landings, hazards of tailwind operation, human-automation interaction, and changing norms and expectations of modern society re training and knowledge.
Don't expect to find answers in one accident, one view, one idea, or in one solution; look at all operations for vulnerabilities, assumptions, and the consequences of not knowing, forgetting, or by just following SOPs.