Yes, every case is different, and this case is one where the whole thing didn't burn down. But, given the available information, they got damn lucky.
The interim report says it all; if they had anything positive to contribute to the non-evacuation debate, they would have at least said something. The decision to defer such a discussion was their way of not pouring fuel on another fire.
Asiana was a very different accident. The flight crew there, by the way, sent the F/As to stations and left them there too (except, of course, for the F/As who'd been ejected already). They waited 90 seconds in a breached, broken, and eventually burning aircraft before initiating an evacuation on their own while the boys at front fiddled with their radios.
Here, on the other hand, we have a problem that developed some time before and that the crew seems to have decided to combat largely with the power of positive thinking. At every step, their actions suggest someone seeing something anomalous and thinking: what's the best possible scenario?
An optimist's brief existence ends in absolute disappointment.
Put another way, accidents can and do happen to the most competent crews. But an accident is a powerful moment of cognitive dissonance, and you could have folks up front so far behind that they're doing everything to convince themselves there is no fire. How do you train for that?