Joys and complications of teaching emergencies
I instructed an EASA Biennal yesterday - the student, a good PPL I've known for a few years and have instructed before, requested we do a session on handling in-flight emergencies.
Take it as read that we briefed, flew the brief, and debriefed.
The emergencies we covered were full engine failure, partial engine failure, avionics fire, engine fire. All good fun and games, the first two I've dealt with myself in real life, the other two I've certainly briefed and practiced myself more times than I can count myself.
But it concentrated my mind on a few aspects of how PPLs* usually handle emergencies - at least when they're flying with me. Quite a lot of it I tend to think is wrong, and must presumably originate in their original teaching. I'd appreciate other people's thoughts...
(1) STRAIGHT INTO THE PFL
This is definitely the most common fault I see. So, I "fail" the engine on my student, and they throw themselves straight into setting up and executing the field landing, with usually absolutely no thought about trying to investigate and rectify the problem that caused the engine failure - even if there's loads of height and thus time to do so.
This still happens when I partially fail the power, and make it clear that that's what I did. I've heard a few times the expression "the aeroplane now belongs to the insurer", and that seems to be somewhere behind this failure to identify the potential that partial power gives to alleviate and expand the options to solve the situation.
(2) FIELD FIXATION
Okay, engine won't re-start (if they tried!), and the student picks their field, and will then do absolutely everything within their power to make that particular field. Better field presents itself - they ignore it. The selected field starts to seem very poor as they get close to it - won't throw it away and take a different option.
As I said in yesterday's debrief, if you walk away from an engine failure - absolutely nobody will ask if you made the field you were aiming for!
Whilst we're at it, the number of times over my few years of instructing I've pulled the engine well within glide range of the runway of a disused airfield with a clear runway - and they still set up for a field. Is there a mentality that using a runway is somehow "cheating"?
(3) I KNOW WHAT THE PROBLEM IS
I suspect that this has its roots in the very limited number of emergencies that tend to get taught in both the PPL and CPL syllabi. Students will tend to assume from the first sign of any symptom that they know what the problem and correct responses are. I find that I really need to force the issue to get pilots to take enough time to properly diagnose what is going on, and develop an appropriate response.
A lot of this comes down to an acronym that certainly I've met in numerous CRM / safety refreshers - DODAR...
Diagnose
Options?
Decide
Act
Review
(rinse and repeat as often as required).
I believe that this is fairly universally taught nowadays, but I really wonder how often it really finds its way from the briefing room to the cockpit? I seem to see, probably 80% of the time in most PPLs just "Decide, Act", with no initial Diagnosis, and virtually nothing by way of subsequent Review of actions and whether those continue to be appropriate to the developing emergency.
Thoughts anybody?
G
* I single out PPLs, simply because I've instructed only a couple of people with professional licences, and don't think I've seen a meaningful sample.