Many years ago, a similar incident (not accident) happened at Nadi Airport, Fiji involving a Boeing 737-200. Shortly after take off loss of System A Hydraulics occurred.
The crew held in VMC in the local area until the Loss of System A checklist was completed and a return to Nadi was made. The runway length was in excess of 10,000 feet; far in excess of that needed for a flap 15 landing.
A normal touch down was made at the correct planned speed and the pilot attempted to select reverse thrust. He was unable to move the reverse thrust levers beyond the interlock position and assumed an unidentified defect caused this. He applied maximum manual braking bringing the 737 to a stop half way down the runway. He then set the park brake while he discussed the situation with the first officer.
Unknown to him the brakes were very hot which resulted in the fuseable plugs actuating and the brakes seized. It took a considerable time to arrange to get the aircraft cleared from the runway so other aircraft could land.
This all happened many years ago. Initial Type Rating training for company pilots was conducted by third party. That would have included manual reversion or loss of System A and System B. It is not known if slow operation of thrust reversers was emphasised during that training. However the FCTM (and that includes the 737 Classics to this day), cautioned that thrust reversers will deploy and retract at a slower rate. The FCTM did not amplify that statement by saying anything about the time needed to get past the thrust lever interlocks before reverse could be applied. In fact it is a lot longer than one would think.
At the time, recurrent training in the company 737-200's was conducted in the real aircraft due to occasional logistical problems with obtaining simulator time. Of course there are common sense constraints on what non-normal can be tested in the real aircraft. That includes landing with hydraulic failures
Unless pilots have experienced in the simulator the delays caused by the "hang ups" against the interlocks (for want of a better description) that are a characteristic of reverse thrust lever operation if using the standby hydraulic system, then such an event is liable to catch them by surprise. In the Nadi incident, the pilot understandably thought the reversers had failed on him at a critical time and he rushed to get on to the brakes. That is being wise after the event of course
Different simulators for the same aircraft type should still have standardised responses but that is not always so. One 737 Classic simulator can take up to eight seconds from reverse lever actuation to get through the interlocks and that is a long time if the pilot is sweating on getting into full reverse asap.
Another simulator can take less than half that time. The lesson here is that it is important for pilots to be given practice in the simulator at experiencing the delay or hang up in reverse lever operation if operating on the standby hydraulics (lower capacity hydraulic pump). To experience this characteristic for the first time in a real event is quite startling. While the QRH correctly states that a thrust reverser will deploy and retract at a slower rate if normal hydraulic pressure is inoperative, it could be argued the statement is somewhat vague, leaving it to the imagination of the pilot to define `slower rate`.