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Old 19th Jul 2016, 16:01
  #264 (permalink)  
Danny42C
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Fantome (#257),

The story of the loss of Singapore is one of the saddest in our military history. Churchill himself termed it "the worst disaster" in that history. Although we arrived in India less than a year after it had happened, we knew nothing beyond the simple fact that it had done so. Wiki gives (as far as I can see) a balanced and factual account of the seven fatal days: (8th-15th February 1942). Reading it is like watching a train crash in slow motion.

In the years since it has been minutely analysed by military historians: popular opinion has heaped the blame on Percival and his subordinate generals, but I have seen little reference to what may have been the "Achilles Heel" of Singapore - the fresh water supply.

Wiki makes glancing reference to this in its sober account as follows:
...[1] With the vital water supply of the reservoirs in the centre of the island threatened, the Australian 27th Brigade was later ordered to recapture Bukit Panjang as a preliminary move in retaking Bukit Timah.[102] The effort was beaten back by fierce resistance from Imperial Guards troops...
and
...with the British 18th Division being tasked to maintain control of the vital reservoirs...
and
...[13 February] Elsewhere, the Japanese captured the water reservoirs that supplied the town, although they did not cut-off the supply...
and
...The following day, the remaining Allied units fought on. Civilian casualties mounted as one million people[118] crowded into the 3-mile (4.8 km) area still held by the Allies and bombing and artillery fire increased. Civilian authorities began to fear that the water supply would give out. At this time, Percival was advised that large amounts of water were being lost due to damaged pipes and that the water supply was on the verge of collapse ......... ...................By the morning of 15 February, the Japanese had broken through the last line of defence; the Allies were running out of food and ammunition. The anti-aircraft guns had also run out of ammunition and were unable to disrupt Japanese air attacks which were causing heavy casualties in the city centre.............After heated argument and recrimination, all present agreed that no counterattack was possible. Percival opted for surrender.....
I would say, that with the Japanese now in a position to cut off the city's fresh water supply, he had little option

Of course, the first (impregnable ?!!) line of defence was supposed to have been the Navy. Churchill had sent out a "task force" of two battleships, the ageing "Repulse" and one of our newest and best, the "Prince of Wales", with a defensive screen of destroyers. Had that group been at sea barring the path of the invasion transports, the landings in Malaya could never have taken place. But we know what happened to the "properly handled capital ships that could always beat off air attack" - they couldn't.

They had no air cover as they sailed north, and maintained radio silence so as not to alert the invasion fleet. It was hard luck that they were spotted by a Japanese reconnaissance aircraft. It saw them, so they probably saw it (but remained quiet). Not until after the first crippling blow from the torpedo bombers did Admiral Phillips break radio silence. Not to ask for air cover against the second attack which would surely come, but to signal Singapore for a tug to help his POW, limping along at 1½ knots on one shaft, back to port.

The second attack came, he went down in his flagship, the Navy lost 1500 (?) men. Singapore was wide open.

That was the story as I heard it at the time.

(Your #258),
...It happened to a friend of dad's permanent RAAF in Canberra in the late fifties...
He was very lucky to escape alive !
...Ground-looping little bastard."...
Not the only one. The Harvard was notorious. And a Vengeance on one or two occasions ! I suppose it is possible in any tail-dragger (but never heard of a Spitfire doing it).

Danny.