Why would that be a hiccup, megan? The salient points of that article.
Therefore it is necessary to determine the structural factors of safety and operating margins such that the probability of structural failures due to the application of loads during FBW FCS malfunctions is not greater than that found with rotorcraft equipped with traditional flight control systems. To achieve this objective and to ensure an acceptable level of safety, it is necessary to define the failure conditions and their associated frequency of occurrence.”
Seems a prudent approach.
With the FBW FCS system, fully operative strength requirements of Part 29 need not be investigated beyond limit conditions “when it can be shown that the rotorcraft has design features that will not allow it to exceed those limit conditions.” In evaluating failure conditions shown not to be extremely improbable, loads assume failures begin in 1g level flight and include pilot corrective actions. The special conditions also provide that special periodic inspections, daily checks and pre-flight inspections may be used in lieu of failure-detection and -indication systems, but “must be limited to components that are not readily detectable by normal detection and indication systems and where service history shows that inspections will provide an adequate level of safety.”
Is it "service history" that you feel is the location of hiccup in this case?