WITHOUT PREJUDICE
Your Ref: XXXXXXX
MOD Ref: XXXXXXX
Dear Mr. Merrimen,
Air Cadet Glider Fleet
Firstly, I’d like to thank both you and the Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for your replies to my original correspondence dated 14th April 2016. As invited by you, I have now considered the Minister’s comments and feel I must respond and seek further answers from him, via your office.
The MOD has invested a significant sum of Public Money in a fleet of some 146 Grob Viking Gliders and Grob Vigilant Motor Gliders for use by the Air Cadet Organisation. I think I am correct in assuming these aircraft are subject to Military airworthiness regulations. The Minister mentioned the ‘Configuration’ state and I understand this to mean that being both ‘Correct and Maintained’ is a prerequisite to the aircraft being considered airworthy. It is equally important that the information about the 'Material' state of the aircraft is collected and retained, and I am disappointed that in this case the records would seem to have been destroyed. May I ask when this was discovered and what action is being taken to prevent recurrence?
Turning now to related Public Domain information, I note from the minutes of the Public Accounts Committee, which sat in March 1999, some eight or nine years after the Release to Service of the Grob Viking and Vigilant, that the question of a lack of ‘Configuration Control’ is publicly aired.
http://www.publications.parliament.u...00/9030301.htm
So when the Minister mentions ‘Configuration Control Discrepancies’ in his third paragraph, I feel compelled to ask what protocol was adopted for the Air Cadet Glider Fleet from its inception? Particularly so, as some limited research of Public Domain information makes uncomfortable reading on the issue of a wider lack of ‘Configuration Control’ within other MOD aircraft fleets. For example, was the configuration ever controlled, or was the practice cancelled at some point? If so, by whom?
Similarly, when the Viking and Vigilant aircraft were Released to Service, was there a valid Safety Case? If not, why was the aircraft released? If there was, when was it cancelled or withdrawn, and who approved this?
What is concerning here is that the PAC heard evidence from MOD’s Chief of Defence Procurement admitting poor Configuration Control in other aircraft. See specifically the Q&A response to Q35 on the above URL link. On a prima facie basis, this appears to have been a serious failing by the MOD. It therefore seems clear that over a period of time from the beginning of the 90’s, the original ‘Safety Case’ for the fleet became progressively invalid, even under pre MAA Regulations. If this is the case, then those responsible need to be held to account. I have read, for example, the Nimrod Review, which would seem to articulate similar failings.
In the above context, I note the comment made recently by Air Vice Marshal Andrew Turner CBE, MA, MSc, BA, FRAeS FCMI, RAF, AOC 22 Group, in his paper published by the RAeS in their ‘Aerospace’ magazine.
"It was simply not an option to continue to operate without a Safety Case"
So yes, while the Minister is quite correct in saying ‘The safety of Air Cadets must remain paramount’ and ‘Any doubt regarding the airworthiness of an aircraft in which they fly is unacceptable’, it would appear that for many years MOD has not implemented its own regulations to ensure the safety of the Air Cadets. My question, as a layman, is how can an entire fleet be without a Safety Case? On the face of it, this is worse than the Nimrod, which actually had a safety case, albeit invalid.
Finally, whilst I won’t presume to advise the Minister, even if the MOD/RAF may have disputes with its contractors, it seems odd to me for the ‘contributory parties’ to ‘discuss the apportionment of respective liabilities’ as mentioned in the Ministers letter. That, in my opinion, should be done by an independent arbiter and the outcome made public, as we are talking of Public Money.
I look forward to receiving the Ministers reply,
Yours sincerely,