Please stop trotting out this nonsense about the captain being ignorant of sector whiteout. The CVR shows that he knew of the problem. I would venture to suggest that he knew about from the mid-1950s, flying sorties out of Wigram in a Harvard. One of the first things his instructor would have warned him about when flying close to Mount Hutt in a low overcast was the visual issue.
So when he made his unannounced descent below MSA through that hole in the cloud, claiming to be VMC, he knew full well that he was not.Why did he do that? Because he was actually relying on the AINS, and he also knew full well the AINS was not to be used for a descent of that nature. This was why he was pleased to be offered a radar-assisted descent (which never came,but he went ahead regardless.)
When he levelled out at 2000 feet, there was no “false horizon”. That was something dreamt up by Vette, unsupported by any of the experts. There was no horizon, so he should have been out straight away.Instead, down to 1500 – ”we’ll probably see further anyway”. He then went on for two full minutes inside a ping-pong ball, before deciding to bale out. The F/O said it was clear to the right if he wanted to do a 180. Answer ”No negative”, and he pulls out the heading select knob and initiates a LEFT turn. Left, towards where he’ssupposed to think the high ground to be. Why did he do that?
No-one will ever know, but my theory is that the pennies stared to drop. Told at the briefing that the waypoint was at McMurdo Station.The night before, he discovered that the waypoint was 20 miles west, but he didn’t check it. Also discovered that a track to McMurdo Station went over Erebus. What if the waypoint is at McMurdo Station, like I was told at the breifing? That would explain the communication problems. It would also mean that Mt Bird is to my right, so the only way out is left.