An interesting courtroom drama play script . . .(minus Robertson's perambulating propensity for theatrics). But as far as enlarging upon our understanding ,. . . ??? then again. . as relevant as my own occasional sweeping digressions .
As with any prosecutor's bag of tricks it is slanted against the plaintiff from the outset.
Captain Collins counsel if he was doing his job would have briefed Jim Collins
whatever you do not admit any errors of judgement. If an attempt is made to put words in your mouth such as you had no idea where that mountain was, exactly ? , you say truthfully that there was no reason to suspect you would at any time be closer to Erebus than 20 miles at the least.
without a long adjournment I think this could be doing my head in . ..
3-holer . .. . your #817 . .. think you might need to insert 'not' in the last line.
(of course anything and everything can be challenged. . . but in this case the facts as confirmed and never denied after Morrie Davis came clean support a position that
the finding . . . of the failure of the airline's nav department to etc etc . .is not now or ever open to any
legitimate challenge.)
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THE PROBITY OF THE CHIEF INSPECTOR OF ACCIDENTS.
Just in case anyone following or coming new to this debate is labouring under the misapprehension that the conduct of the initial investigation into the accident was entirely transparent and above board, here is an extract from an article by Captain Gary Parata , who found alarming departures from the accepted protocols for making the transcripts from the recovered CVR.
Captain Parata (then Chairman of NZALPA’s Accident, Incident and Safety Group and a flight recorder specialist with the IFALPA Accident Analysis and Prevention Committee) considered flaws in the procedure used for the production of the published transcript, and why – as a result of those procedural flaws – the Chief Inspector’s theory and conclusions were misleading.
The initial CVR Group assembled by Mr R Chippindale travelled to Washington and underwent specialised training, adhered strictly to that training, and produced a single, handwritten transcript. For their efforts and professionalism they were roundly praised by NTSB and FBI experts.
(But) the transcript actually published in the formal accident report was significantly different to the version produced by the CVR Group. Chippindale made 55 changes to the transcript without consultation with the CVR Group and in direct contravention of accepted protocols. Chippindale’s actions were inexplicable - ‘at best, an extraordinarily non-standard performance; at worst, a highly improper and prejudicial act.’
The complete failure of the accident-investigation system to identify and prevent unprofessional conduct like this was what Justice Mahon later described as “culpability of the organisational system” (Mahon, 1981).
Last edited by Fantome; 19th Jun 2016 at 17:43.