Megan,
You need a little comprehension prospector. My post was quite plain, the plotting he had done the previous night. Perhaps I was not clear enough.
I initially thought that was what you meant. Then I thought surely not, of what point is plotting your position on a school atlas prior to the flight relative to deciding to go below MSA without knowing precisely your position.
It is not as if it would have been any hardship, there was a readout right above their heads with continually updated Lat and Long. To transfer that to a chart would be a very simple matter.
The lack of any meaningful effort to establish exactly their position prior to descent below MSA means one has to agree with Bob Thomson's comments that this crew thought "they were on a Sunday drive".
for the simple reason they wouldn’t have the RADAR monitoring that was demanded. As the US said, being able to provide radar monitoring was “absurd”.
What rubbish, try to stick to established known reported fact. I quoted in a previous post, from Gordon Vette's "Impact Erebus" that the radar could be switched to surveillance mode, and it was in that mode , it was well capable of monitoring the approved descent as promulgated to this crew prior to departure.
Had they been able to fly the IMC cloudbreak, which they couldn’t, there was absolutely no guidance given should they find themselves in whiteout conditions ie able to see the base buildings, aircraft and vehicles on the runway, but nothing else. Scramble back to the MSA, after spending whatever time it would take to realise the predicament they were in, of which they have zero experience, and what escape route to take?
Once again completely wrong. The weather report they received was well below condition required for any descent, and they were even advised that the area was no good at all for any sightseeing. All this information is available in relevant publications. Would suggest you avail yourself of this information.
As the US said, being able to provide radar monitoring was “absurd”.
From where did you glean that information??
Here again is the actual weather at the relevant time, you will note that Ross Island is reported as being completely obscured by cloud, not sector whiteout, cloud. You will also note, or perhaps not, that the cloud cover at McMurdo was total at 3,500, how could any descent be commenced that was limited to 6,000ft?
Weather at the McMurdo area at the time of the disaster was reported to be completely overcast at 3,500ft with other cloud layers above, and a wind of 10 knots. Mountain tops in the area were covered in cloud and although the surface visibility was good surface definition was poor and horizon definition only fair because the sun was obscured and snow surface features could not be readily identified from close up. Other aircraft in the area reported Ross Island as being completely obscured by cloud, and the crew of a helicopter which landed at Cape Bird Hut, 35 kilometres from the crash site and only an hour later, said it was overcast art 1,500ft with light snow Shortly afterwards they landed on the beach 10 kilometres from the site, in snow flurries and deteriorating conditions which made them cut short their
visit
Now please advise how you think any descent was justified,? yes it was a sightseeing flight, but the pax had been advised if weather conditions were not suitable they would go to an alternate area. The crew's ultimate job was to get the pax back home again, safe and sound, if they missed their sightseeing through weather the company could not be held accountable for that. It was always a possibility, and I would be quite certain they would rather have missed Scott Base and got home again.